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I.

INTRODUCTION

EALING with client perjury presents one of the most difficult
ethical problems a lawyer might face.' The courts, organized
bar and commentators have never agreed on the appropriate response to client perjury and the issue continues to generate
heated debate. The new Model Rules of Professional Conduct 2
D

t This article is based on a speech delivered in July 1988 at the
Pennsylvania Conference of State Trial Judges. The Conference is sponsored
annually by The Pennsylvania College of the Judiciary.
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. B.A. Glassboro
State College, 1974; J.D. Villanova University School of Law, 1981.
1. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 177 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring); id.
at 177 & n. 1 (Blackmun, J., concurring); United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson,
555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977); Rieger, Client Perjury: A Proposed Resolution of the
Constitutional and Ethical Issues, 70 MINN. L. REV. 121, 121-27 (1985).
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983). The American Bar As-

sociation (ABA) House of Delegates adopted the Model Rules of Professional
responsibility (Model Rules) on August 2, 1983, to replace the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (Model Code). The Model Code has been in force
since its original proposal in 1969. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-

rTy preface (1980); McKay, In Support of the ProposedModel Rules of Professional Conduct, 26 VILL. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (1981). The drafting process of the Model
Rules was long and filled with controversy. It began in 1977 when the ABA
appointed the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, or the
Kutak Commission, as it became known. See McKay, supra, at 1142-43. Numerous drafts proposing different formats as well as different substantive provisions
were circulated over a period of five years until the final version was approved by
the ABA in 1983. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed
Final Draft 1982); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final

(63)
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(Model Rules) proposed by the American Bar Association (ABA)
change what was understood to be the organized bar's position
on the problem. With Pennsylvania's recent adoption 3 (Pennsylvania Rules) of its own version of the ABA's proposed Model
Rules, a version which departs substantially from the ABA proposal in the perjury context, 4 consideration of the client perjury
problem in light of Pennsylvania's approach seems appropriate.
As a general matter, lawyers are obligated to preserve client
confidences under both the rules governing professional conduct 5 and the law of attorney-client privilege. 6 Pennsylvania Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.6, which expresses this confidentiality
obligation, makes an exception to the requirement by permitting
disclosure of confidential "information if necessary to comply
with the duties stated in rule 3.3."7 This provision relates directly
to the lawyer's response to client perjury since rule 3.3, under the
heading "Candor to the Tribunal," provides: "A lawyer shall not
knowingly... offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If
a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its
falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures. A
lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false." 8 Rule 3.3 implements one aspect of rule 1.2(d)
which states that "[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage,
or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
Draft 1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Alternative Draft 1981);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft 1980). All of these
drafts preceded the version finally adopted in 1983. The five-year period was
marked by strident debate over the substance of the Model Rules. See generally A.
KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 18-19 (1984); Legal Ethics:
Ideas in Conflict, 26 VILL. L. REV. 1119 (1981). The controversy continues as five
years after promulgation of the Model Rules, just half of the states have adopted
them-many doing so with significant substantive changes.
3. In Re Code of Professional Responsibility, No. 412 Disciplinary Docket
No. 2 (Pa. Oct. 15, 1987) (order adopting Rules of Professional Conduct to supersede Code of Professional Responsibility). The new Pennsylvania Rules of
Professional Conduct became effective on April 1, 1988.
4. For a discussion of the difference between the ABA's proposed Model
Rules and the new Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, see infra notes
70-74 and accompanying text.
5. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980).
6. See Packel, Confidentiality Under the PennsylvaniaAttorney-Client Privilege Statutes and the New Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, 34 VILL. L. REV. 91, 108
(1989).

7.
8.
(1987).

PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
PENNSYLVANIA

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
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fraudulent .... ,9 While the goal seems a good one, and the rules
appear straightforward, there is no simple solution to the lawyer's
problem when faced with client perjury.
A lawyer owes a duty of undiminished, undivided loyalty to
his client.' 0 At the same time the lawyer, as an officer of the
court, has a duty to the legal system. While in most instances
these obligations complement one another, in situations of client
perjury, they may come into sharp conflict. This conflict creates
an extraordinary tension which may be further complicated by the
lawyer's own conscience."I
A lawyer may face the question of client perjury either before
or after the fact. When the issue arises will affect the analysis and
responses.
II.

ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF CLIENT'S INTENT

TO COMMIT PERJURY

A lawyer may know in advance that her client intends to commit perjury. This brings into play rule 1.2(d) and its prohibition
against a lawyer knowingly assisting a client to engage in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. Perjury certainly
would qualify. Further, it brings in rule 3.3(a)(4) which prohibits
a lawyer from offering evidence she knows to be false, and rule
3.3(c), which allows a lawyer to refuse to offer evidence she reasonably believes is false.
A.

When Does a Lawyer "Know"?

When a lawyer has advance knowledge of a client's intention
to commit perjury, the initial question is on what basis the lawyer
reached this conclusion. The lawyer's level of certainty will affect
whether he "knows,"' 12 "reasonably believes,"' 3 or merely sus9. PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1987).

10. See United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir.
1977); Commonwealth v. Alderman, 292 Pa. Super. 263, 270, 437 A.2d 36, 40
(1981); PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT preamble; PENNYSLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment (1987); see also
Rieger, supra note 1, at 122-27.
11. See Wilcox, 555 F.2d at 122;Alderman, 292 Pa. Super. at 270, 437 A.2d at
40; PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT preamble; PENNSYLVANIA
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 3.3 comment (1987); Brazil, Unanticipated Client Perjury and the Collision of Rules of Ethics, Evidence and ConstitutionalLaw,
44 Mo. L. REV. 601, 609 (1979).
12. See PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4)
(1987).
13. See PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(c) (1987).
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pects that his client intends to perjure himself. This will have an
impact on the lawyer's course of action.
In the easiest case, the client announces, or virtually announces, to the lawyer that she intends to perjure herself. In Nix
v. Whiteside,'14 Whiteside was charged with murdering Love in
Love's apartment.' 5 Whiteside told his court appointed counsel
that he had stabbed Love as Love was "pulling a pistol from underneath the pillow on the bed."' 6 Counsel questioned Whiteside further and the defendant indicated that he had not actually
seen a gun, but that he was convinced Love had one. None of
Whiteside's companions saw a gun, nor did the police search turn
one up, although Love had a reputation for carrying a gun.
Counsel explained to Whiteside that he did not have to prove the
actual existence of a gun to establish his claim of self-defense, but
only that Whiteside reasonably believed Love had a gun.17
However, approximately a week before trial, during counsels'
preparation of Whiteside's direct testimony, Whiteside said he
had seen something "metallic" in Love's hand. When pressed by
counsel about this apparent inconsistency, Whiteside responded:
"[I]n Howard Cook's case there was a gun. If I don't say I saw a
gun, I'm dead."' 8
Whiteside never said "I have to lie to get off," but he virtually
said it. His statement, "If I don't say I saw a gun, I'm dead,"
implied that Whiteside was lying about seeing a metallic object
and was not simply departing from his previously consistent statements that he had not actually seen a gun. From this, his counsel
could conclude with certainty that he was proposing perjury.
In Commonwealth v. Alderman, 19 the Pennsylvania Superior
Court discussed the level of certainty required before a lawyer
must take action with respect to a client's perjury.2 0 In that case
the defendant was on trial for burglary, assault and possession of
an instrument of crime relating to a shooting and burglary incident. The defendant himself had been wounded. According to
counsel, the defendant had told counsel prior to trial that he had
been at the scene of the crime in order to collect a debt. With
14. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
15. Id. at 160.

16. Id.
17. Id. at 161.
18. Id.
19. 292 Pa. Super. 263, 437 A.2d 36 (1981).
20. This case was decided when the old Code of Professional Responsibility
was in force, but the court's rationale is persuasive nonetheless.
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respect to what happened, the defendant said: "It was a kind of
self-defense kind of thing." 2 1 Counsel also testified that the defendant's mother had told him that the defendant had gone to the
house to collect a debt and had been involved in the crime with
which he was charged. During the trial, the client, for the first
time, claimed that he had not been at the scene of the crime and
that he had received the incriminating injuries by accidentally
22
shooting himself with his father's gun.

Commenting on the level of certainty required before a lawyer must act, the superior court stated:
Every change in a defendant's story should not be
viewed by counsel as a fabrication. Here, however, there
could have been no reasonable doubt but that appellant's newly discovered alibi was a fabrication. The
change in appellant's story could not be explained as an
error of memory, and nothing suggested that appellant
was trying to shield someone-nor does appellant now
23
offer either of these explanations.
At the opposite end of the spectrum from Nix and Alderman,
are situations in which a lawyer simply forms a personal opinion
that his client is lying. This may be based on his resolution of
conflicting evidence or his own opinion of the guilt or innocence
of the defendant. Does this lawyer "know" his client intends to
commit perjury? Does he "reasonably believe" it?
In United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson,2 4 the defendant's lawyer requested permission to withdraw in the midst of trial because
she believed her client intended to perjure himself on the stand.
Subsequently, the defendant challenged his conviction in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel. In granting the defendant's petition, 2 5 the court found
21. Alderman, 292 Pa. Super. at 267, 437 A.2d at 38.
22. Id. at 266-67, 437 A.2d at 37-38.
23. Id. at 269, 437 A.2d at 39.
24. 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977).
25. Id. at 119. The court granted the petition for a variety of reasons not
limited to the disclosure. The trial judge informed the defendant "that if he
insisted on testifying," counsel would be permitted to withdraw, "and defendant
would have to represent himself for the remainder of the trial." Id. at 117. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that this ruling
impermissibly forced the defendant to choose between his right to testify and his
right to counsel. Id. at 122. The court found that the circumstances interfered
with Wilcox's right to testify on his own behalf and his right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 120-21. Further, the court was concerned with the problem of disclosure by counsel to the trial judge. Id. at 122.
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that his trial lawyer, in seeking to withdraw the way she did, had
effectively disclosed to the trial court her belief that her client intended to perjure himself.
However, at the habeas corpus hearing, when asked to explain her reasons, trial counsel could not recall the basis on which
she decided the defendant intended to lie under oath, nor could
she produce file notes which supported that conclusion. She referred to her familiarity with the defendant from having represented him in previous unrelated criminal cases. On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit criticized the
basis of counsel's conclusion and stated that before disclosure to
the court of a client's intent to commit perjury, an attorney must
have a "firm factual basis" for his belief,26 and that "private conjectures about the guilt or innocence of his client" were
27
insufficient.
The language of the Model Rules provides some guidance as
to the level of certainty required before a lawyer must act. As
noted above, rule 3.3 states that a lawyer shall not knowingly offer
evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. The Pennsylvania
Rules define "knowingly" and "knows" as "denot[ing] actual
knowledge of the fact in question," but add that "knowledge may
be inferred from circumstances." 2 8 This, however, does not answer the question of how sure a lawyer must be before the rule
comes into play.
One commentator, dealing with the old Code of Professional
Responsibility, has suggested that a lawyer should not act in a way
which that commentator characterized as turning on his client,
unless he is convinced at least beyond a reasonable doubt that the
client will perjure himself.29 At a minimum, before she takes any
steps which might threaten to rend the delicate fabric of the attor26. Id. at 122.
27. Id. Again, at the time of the Wilcox decision, attorneys in Pennsylvania
were not governed by the Model Rules, but by the previous Code of Professional
Responsibility. The court, however, never specifically cited the Code for its
analysis, and its conclusion regarding the basis for an attorney's belief that her
client will commit perjury as a reflection of its balancing of the duty to maintain
confidence versus the duty to maintain the integrity of the tribunal is persuasive.

28.

PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

terminology (1987).

29. Brazil, supra note 11, at 608-09. Professor Brazil was analyzing the Missouri version of the old Model Code's Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B), which required disclosure of a client's past perjury and did not provide an exception to
disclosure if it would involve revealing a privileged communication. Id. at 604
n.6. The version of the rule recommended by the ABA included an exception
for privileged communications. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 7-102(B) (1980).
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69

ney-client relationship, a lawyer should be certain that her client,
in fact, intends to commit perjury, and that certainty must not be
based on instinct, intuition or her personal opinion of the true
story. 30 Rather, it should be based on the sort of irrefutable evidence present in the Alderman 31 case.
Another provision of rule 3.3 permits a lawyer to refuse to offer evidence he "reasonably believes" is false.3 2 Obviously, this rule
contemplates a lesser standard than "knows." Unfortunately, the
Pennsylvania Rules' definition of "reasonably believes" adds little, providing that the condition is satisfied if the lawyer believes
the matter in question and the belief is reasonable. 33 However,
because of the implications of refusing to offer evidence which the
client wishes to have presented, the lawyer must be convinced to a
certainty, based on a firm factual foundation, before he refuses to
present evidence.
B.

What Should a Lawyer Do?

Assuming the lawyer is convinced that his client intends to
commit perjury, what action must he take? It is clear that a lawyer
cannot participate in presenting perjury to a tribunal. 34 The law30. Cf Wilcox, 555 F.2d at 122 (attorney must have firm factual basis for
belief of intent of client to commit perjury).
31. Alderman, 282 Pa. Super. at 267, 437 A.2d at 38 (applying "reasonable
doubt" as standard for counsel certainty of a client's intent to perjure himself).

32.

PENNSYLVANIA

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(c) (1987)

(emphasis added).
33. PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT terminology (1987).

34. As noted above, for the lawyer to participate in presentation of perjurious testimony would violate the specific prohibition of rule 3.3(a)(4), and the
more general prohibition of rule 1.2(d). See Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 167-71
(1986); People v. Brown, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1335, 1339, 250 Cal. Rptr. 762, 764
(1988); Alderman, 292 Pa. Super. at 270-72, 437 A.2d at 39-40.
Some authorities suggest that to participate would amount to subornation
of perjury by the attorney. See People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8, 11 (Colo. 1981).
Pennsylvania defines subornation of perjury as requiring proof of "perjury by a
witness plus proof that the accused induced, persuaded and instigated the witness to commit the crime of perjury." Commonwealth v. Mervin, 230 Pa. Super.
552, 556, 326 A.2d 602, 604 (1974). Whether presentation of false evidence
without suggesting or actually inducing it would meet this standard is unclear. It
should be noted that Schultheis dealt not with client perjury, but rather with the
client's desire that the lawyer put alibi witnesses other than the defendant on the
stand. 638 P.2d at 11-12. While this has a major impact on the whole question
of how to proceed, it should have no impact on whether the attorney's actions
constituted subornation of perjury. However, since the Schultheis suggestion that
such action would constitute subornation of perjury was only dictum, it is perhaps not a clear indication of what the court would decide if the matter were
before it in the context of client perjury.
The dissenting minority to the position that a lawyer must act to prevent
client perjury, represented most vocally by Monroe Freedman's eloquent argu-
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yer's first step should be to dissuade his client from committing
perjury. The purely strategic arguments a lawyer can make in this
context are as compelling as the ethical ones. Lying on the witness stand is simply a bad idea. First, opposing counsel will be
able to cross-examine the client, a tool designed to ferret out untruth. Second, he may have credible rebuttal testimony that will
expose the lie. Third, once exposed, the client faces not only a
charge of perjury, but also ajury which now might not believe any
part of his case, as well as a judge who more than likely will take
the obvious perjury into account in any discretionary decisions
she makes.
Nix v. Whiteside3 5 offers an example of the sort of persuasion
counsel might employ. In that case, faced with the inconsistency
described above, counsel told Whiteside that as officers of the
court they could not allow Whiteside to commit perjury. Counsel
also advised Whiteside that if he took the stand and lied under
oath, it would be counsels' duty to advise the court that they believed Whiteside was committing perjury. Counsel also stated
that they would probably be called to testify as rebuttal witnesses
for the prosecution to impeach Whiteside's testimony. Finally,
counsel informed Whiteside that they would seek to withdraw if
36
Whiteside insisted on committing perjury.
The United States Supreme Court held that the course of action taken by Whiteside's counsel was perfectly consistent with
the reasonable requirements of the codes of ethics, and did not
destroy the attorney-client relationship so as to deny him his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.3 7 How much of
this holding is based on the Supreme Court's conclusion in dicta
that disclosure would be a perfectly appropriate response is unclear. What is clear is the Court's conclusion that counsel may
become quite aggressive in attempting to dissuade a client from
ments, would suggest that the lawyer should not take any action beyond seeking
to dissuade the client upon learning that the client intends to commit perjury,
but rather should present the testimony in the same fashion as he would any
other testimony. See THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT Rules, Rules
1.1-1.5 comment, Rules illustrative cases 1 (a)-(b), (i), (j) (Roscoe Pound, American Trial Lawyers Found. Comm'n on Professional Responsibility, Discussion
Draft 1981).

35. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
36. Id. at 161.
37. Id. at 174-75. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that counsels' actions had created such a conflict between lawyers
and client that the attorney-client relationship was destroyed and Whiteside was
denied effective assistance of counsel. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1328
(8th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
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committing perjury without destroying the attorney-client
relationship.
Frequently such vigorous persuasion by counsel will work,
and it is one reason we protect confidences, even at times where
to do so appears contrary to the search for truth. Our system
relies on the client's ability to be absolutely candid with counsel
without fear of being judged and without fear of secrets being
used against her. The client should not decide what is relevant
and what is not-what helps her case and what hurts it.38 Rather,
that is best left to the professional judgment of the lawyer-the
39
client's one champion against a hostile world.
With complete and candid information, not only can a lawyer
effectively prepare his client's case, but also he has the opportunity to use his persuasive powers and superior knowledge to dissuade his client from pursuing an illegal (and unwise) course of
action. He will not have that chance if the client is afraid to be
honest. 40 The protection of confidentiality of information disclosed to the lawyer, and the loyalty of the lawyer to the client are
critical to establishing the trust that encourages the candor neces41
sary for the system to work.
However, if the lawyer's persuasive skills do not work and the
client still insists on testifying falsely, the lawyer's course becomes
somewhat tricky, with the analysis differing depending on
whether a criminal or civil trial is involved. Generally speaking,
because the lawyer cannot participate in presenting perjury, she
must extricate herself. Two options come to mind: simply refuse
to put the client on the stand, or withdraw from representation.
Neither offers a clean escape, and the problem has spawned numerous unsatisfactory attempts at compromise.
Counsel's refusal to put the client on the stand 4 2 raises diffi38. M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 4-5 (1975).
Professor Freedman cites the following example:
[Olne client was reluctant to tell her lawyer that her husband had attacked her with a knife, because it tended to confirm that she had in fact
shot him (contrary to what she had at first maintained). Having been
persuaded by her attorney's insistence upon complete and candid disclosure, she finally "confessed all"-which permitted the lawyer to defend her properly and successfully on grounds of self-defense.
Id.
39. See Symposium Proceedings, 26 VILL. L. REV. 1119, 1205-06 (1981).
40. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 38, at 30-31.
41. See Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 356 Pa. Super. 5, 13-15, 514 A.2d 114,
118-19 (1986) (frank disclosure promotes proper administration of justice), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 589, 534 A.2d 769 (1987).
42. A slightly different set of questions arise when the proposed perjury is
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cult questions, especially in the context of criminal trials. If the
client insists on taking the stand, and the lawyer insists she not do
so, who holds the trump card?
Rule 1.2 mandates that a lawyer abide by the client's decisions concerning the objectives of trial and consult with the client
as to the means by which they are to be pursued. 4 3 While no absolute line between means and objectives can be drawn, 44 the decision of what witnesses to call or what evidence to offer has
traditionally been 45viewed as a tactical call, falling within the
"means" category.
Thus, the lawyer might simply consult with
the client and then decide not to offer the client's own testimony.
Such an approach is also supported by rule 3.3(c) which permits a
lawyer to refuse to offer evidence the lawyer reasonably believes
is false. 46 But quite apart from the general question of what evidence to offer, the decision as to whether the accused himself
should testify is so important and so personal that it should be
made by him, and not relegated to a strategic-means decision to
be made by counsel. Pennsylvania law specifically holds that the
47
defendant should make the decision of whether to testify.
In criminal cases the question is complicated by the possibility that the criminal defendant may have a constitutionally protected right to testify on his own behalf. While the United States
Supreme Court has never specifically held that a criminal defendant has the right to testify on his own behalf, the Court has observed that "cases in several Circuits have so held, and the right
has been long assumed.''48 Pennsylvania's Constitution specifies
not that of the client, but rather of witnesses the client wishes to call. This must
be carefully distinguished and will be discussed only to the extent relevant to the
discussion of client perjury.
43. PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1987).
44. Id. comment; see also C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 156 (1986).
45. See People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8, 12 (Colo. 1981) (defense counsel
determines which witnesses to call); see also STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4.52(b)
(1979) [hereinafter DEFENSE STANDARDS] (attorney has exclusive control over all
strategic and tactical decisions).
46. PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(c) (1987).
47. Commonwealth v. Fowler, 362 Pa. Super. 81, 87, 523 A.2d 784, 787
(1987) (decision whether to testify on one's own behalf ultimately made by accused), appealdenied, 517 Pa. 598, 535 A.2d 1056 (1987); Commonwealth v. Wallace, 347 Pa. Super. 248, 254, 500 A.2d 816, 819 (1985) (decision whether to
testify rests solely with defendant).
48. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 164; United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076
(7th Cir. 1984) (defendant has personal constitutional right to testify truthfully
on his own behalf), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1064 (1986); United States v. Bifield,
702 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 1983) (accused has constitutionally guaranteed right
"to be present and to be heard in person" at trial), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931
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that the criminal defendant has a right "to be heard by himself and
his counsel." 4 9 However, the defendant's right to testify does not
carry with it a right to testify falsely. 50 An argument could therefore be made that once convinced the criminal defendant intends
to commit perjury, the lawyer could refuse to put her on the
stand.
This approach appears somewhat extreme, although the ABA
has suggested it as an option. 5' It would allow the lawyer to act as
judge, jury and prosecutor with respect to the client's important
constitutional right. It would also prevent the client from telling
any part of her story, not just the part deemed perjurious. Such
an extreme approach does not seem to be contemplated even by
Justice Burger's strict view of the appropriate reaction elaborated
in dicta in Whiteside.52 Thus, regardless of whether the decision to
testify is classified as a "means" or an "objective," the constitutional implications of keeping a criminal defendant off the witness
stand will probably force counsel to let the client testify.
In a civil suit, because a party has no comparable constitutional right to testify, it would seem that counsel could keep his
client off the stand if counsel believes his client would commit
53
perjury. Accordingly, the Model Rules would permit this.
There is, of course, another possible solution-withdrawing
from the case. It is the lawyer's participation in offering the perjury that creates the ethical problem in the first place. 54 If the
lawyer can extricate herself from the perjury, the problem may be
(1983); see also People v. Brown, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1335, 1340, 250 Cal. Rptr.
762, 765 (1988) (defendant has fundamental right to testify on his own behalf).
49. PA. CONST. art. I, § 9 (1974, amended 1984) (emphasis added). It is
possible that this provision was included only to change the traditional common
law rule which not only gave the defendant no right to testify, but in fact made
him incompetent to do so.
50. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 173.
51. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 87353, at 901:106 (1987) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 87-353] (lawyer's responsibility with respect to client perjury). The Committee suggests this course of
action in "the unusual case" where the client has clearly stated an intention to
testify falsely and the lawyer is unable to withdraw from the case. Id. For further
discussion of the options presented by the Committee, see infra notes 78-95 and
accompanying text.
52. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 159-76. For further discussion of Whiteside, see
supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.

53. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 44, at 657.
54. Recall we are trying to comply with rule 3.3, which prohibits a lawyer
from offering false evidence, and rule 1.2, which prohibits a lawyer from assisting a client to engage in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. For
further discussion of these rules see supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
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solved. Rule 1.16 requires a lawyer to withdraw from representation if continued representation will result in violation of the rules
of professional conduct or other law, 55 and permits a lawyer to
withdraw from representation if the client "persists in a course of
action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably
believes is criminal or fraudulent." 56 Involving the lawyer in
knowingly offering perjured testimony would seem to fit neatly
into either of these rules. 5 7 Therefore, we might assume that
withdrawal is the solution. However, it may neither solve the
problem nor be possible.
As a preliminary matter, does withdrawal solve the problem?
On the face of things, it would appear to solve the particular lawyer's problem because she is no longer involved in the offering of
perjured testimony. She has, in the most decisive way, extricated
herself from the mire. But does this protect the court from the
perjury? Recall it is the lawyer's duty as an officer of that court
and her obligation to protect the system, contrasted with her obligation to her client, that created the conundrum in the first place.
Does withdrawal prevent the perjury, or simply leave the tribunal
unprotected and dump the problem on the next lawyer unfortunate enough to encounter this client?5 8
Further complicating the problem, the savvy client will now
be educated to cover his perjury so the next lawyer may be completely unaware of it, and the system wholly without protection.
Moreover, the effective representation of the client by this next
lawyer will be impaired in that the client has withheld information
from his "champion" who could be blindsided by the client's unwise tactical choices. Consider, for example, the situation where
the prosecution has irrefutable evidence to rebut the perjured testimony. New counsel will be unprepared to effectively deal with
this, nor will she have had a chance to argue the client out of
perjury. While we might not have much sympathy for the client,
and a strong case could be made for the proposition that he
brought it on himself, the question remains, have we gained anything by this approach?
55. PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a)(l)
(1987).
56. PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b)(1)
(1987).
57. This is true provided, of course, that the lawyer was certain of the perjury. For a discussion of the certainty requirement, see supra notes 12-33 and
accompanying text.

58. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 38, at 33.
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Assuming withdrawal at least accomplishes compliance with
the mandates of the rules that the lawyer not participate in the
perjury, the other problem is whether withdrawal is even a possible solution. Certainly, where a privately retained criminal defense lawyer finds out well in advance of trial that his client
intends to commit perjury, withdrawal under the rules may be accomplished. However, where the lawyer is court appointed, or
where the criminal trial is imminent, the problem becomes more
difficult. In these cases, a lawyer must receive court approval to
withdraw. 59 Putting aside for the moment the issue of whether
the court will permit withdrawal, how does counsel go about asking for it?
The decision to grant or deny a lawyer's request to withdraw
is within the discretion of the court. 60 Presumably that discretion
cannot be exercised in a vacuum, but rather the court must consider some information. But how much can the lawyer disclose
without breaching his obligation of confidentiality?
If a lawyer simply tells the court she must withdraw, but cannot explain why, the court is very likely to refuse her request. In
fact, to grant the request with no information might violate the
court's duty to exercise its discretion in such matters. However,
refusing the request for withdrawal under these circumstances
may cause irreparable harm to the client's right to effective representation. In effect, the court's refusal has told client and counsel
there is no problem and the representation must continue. There
1
may be a huge problem, but the court has never considered it.6
It is true that the party making the motion bears the burden of
convincing the court, and in the case described, has not done so.
But the point here is that a rule which suggests solving the client
perjury problem by deciding withdrawal requests without inquiry
raises serious problems.
Some have suggested that the lawyer be required to cite irreconcilable conflict and no more in order to be released from
representation. 62 Although this offers an attractive alternative, it
59. See, e.g., McMahon v. Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934, 942 & n.7, 943 (3d Cir.
1987); People v. Brown, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1335, 1339-40, 250 Cal. Rptr. 762,
764-65 (1988); PA. R. CRIM. P. 316(c)(ii).
60. See McMahon, 821 F.2d at 942-43; Brown, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 1339-40,
250 Cal. Rptr. at 764-65; People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8, 15 (Colo. 1981).
61. Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 434-35 (D.C. 1976) (decision
to grant or deny motion to withdraw must be made on an informed basis), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976).
62. Schultheis, 638 P.2d at 13-14.
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may still say too little and at the same time say too much. "Irreconcilable conflict" offers the court precious little additional information with which to exercise its discretion, unless it becomes a
code word for the circumstances of proposed client perjury. If it
is a code word, then the lawyer has disclosed to the court that her
client intends to commit perjury. May she do so? At what point
in pursuing a motion to withdraw has the lawyer "telegraphed" to
the court that her client intends to lie?
In Lowery v. Cardwell,6 3 a criminal bench trial, counsel was
faced with surprise perjury by his client during the client's testimony. Counsel stopped questioning and sought to withdraw, but
told the court he could not state his reason. The court denied
counsel's request. Upon returning to court, counsel abruptly
ended his examination stating he had no further questions. During his closing, counsel made no reference to the testimony in
question. 6 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit concluded that this amounted to an unequivocal announcement to the factfinder of the client's perjury, and as such
was a denial of his right to due process. 65 Similarly, where a lawyer cited chapter and verse of the ethical rules he would violate by
continued representation, he was found to have telegraphed the
66
client's intent to the court.
But is this even an impermissible disclosure?
This question involves two levels of inquiry: the protection
offered by the attorney-client privilege and the protection offered
by the Pennsylvania Rules. 6 7 Turning first to the attorney-client
privilege, an argument can be made that the client's decision to
commit perjury is not protected since it is the announced intention to commit a crime which has traditionally been found to fall
outside the privilege. 68 Arguably, this situation could be covered
by Pennsylvania's "administration of justice" exception as well. 69
63. 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978).
64. Id. at 729.
65. Id. at 730.
66. Schultheis, 638 P.2d at 13.
67. Packel supra note 6, at 91.
68. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 174 (1986) (attorney's duty of confidentiality not
extended to a client's announced plans to engage in future criminal conduct); see
also L. PACKEL & A. POULIN, PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE § 501.5(b) (1987).
69. Brennan v. Brennan, 281 Pa. Super. 362, 376, 422 A.2d 510, 517
(1980) (if exercise of attorney-client privilege clearly operates to frustrate administration of justice, information no longer privileged); see L. PACKEL & A.
POULIN, supra note 68, § 501.5(d) (citing Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 238 Pa.
Super. 456, 464, 357 A.2d 689, 693-94 (1976) (if exercise of privilege frustrates
administration of justice, trial judge may require disclosure)).
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However, even if the client's intention to commit perjury is not
protected, the incriminating facts from which counsel necessarily
must have concluded the client intended to lie should still be protected. Disclosure of the intent to commit perjury very likely will
implicitly disclose these protected facts to the court. Thus, the
question of attorney-client privilege in this context cannot be definitively answered.
But even if we assume the information is not protected by the
attorney-client privilege, the question remains, is the lawyer
bound by the obligation of confidentiality imposed by the rules to
protect this information from disclosure? 70 Traditionally, similar
to the law of privilege, the rules of ethics permitted (but did not
require) disclosure of confidences to prevent a crime when the
client announced his intention to commit a crime. 7' The new
Model Rules, as adopted and promulgated by the ABA, permit
disclosure of the announced intention to commit a crime only if
the lawyer believes the crime will result in death or substantial
bodily harm. 7 2 Under the Model Rules, then, the lawyer could
not disclose his client's intention to commit perjury. However,
Pennsylvania amended the ABA's proposed version of the Rules
when it adopted them. Pennsylvania's rule 1.6 provides that a
lawyer may reveal confidential information if he reasonably believes it is necessary "to prevent.., a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer's services are being
...used." 73 Further, rule 1.6 as adopted by Pennsylvania, provides that a lawyer "shall reveal such information as is necessary
to comply with rule 3.3."74 Thus, the rules as adopted in Pennsylvania would appear to permit disclosure of the intention to
commit perjury, and perhaps require it if it is the only way to prevent the lawyer's participation in perjury. But is disclosure the
best solution to the rule 3.3 problem?
As noted earlier, we protect confidences through the rules of
70.
71.

PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1987).
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1980).

Prior to approval by the ABA of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
adoption by what now amounts to half the jurisdictions including Pennsylvania,
the Model Code was the universally adopted set of rules. For a discussion of the
history of the Model Rules, see supra note 2.

72.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1983).

73. PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(2) (1987).
The Model Rules as promulgated by the ABA contain no such provision.
74. PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1987)
(emphasis added). The Model Rules as promulgated by the ABA contain no
such provision.
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professional responsibility and the law of privilege not only to
benefit the client, but just as important, to benefit the system.
The privilege is to protect, not the guilty, but the administration of justice. "[T]he theory . . .is that the detriment to justice from a power to shut off inquiry to
pertinent facts in court, will be outweighed by the benefits to justice (not to the client) from a franker disclosure
75
in the lawyer's office."
Therefore, perhaps the suggestion of relying on counsel's honest
representation of irreconcilable conflict should suffice. As discussed above, this still leaves the system ofjustice at the mercy of
the perjurious defendant, and raises again the question of
whether withdrawal solves the problem at all, regardless of how it
is accomplished. 76 When relying on "irreconcilable conflict" as
the basis of a withdrawal petition, counsel should make a private
record of the details of his reasons for withdrawal which should
77
be sealed and used only for appellate review if necessary.
If the lawyer is unable to dissuade her client from testifying
falsely in a criminal case where she may be required to put the
client on the stand, and she cannot withdraw (or we conclude that
withdrawal does not solve the problem), what alternatives
remain?78
One solution, which has received favorable response from
75. Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 323 Pa. Super. 317, 329, 470 A.2d 611,

616 (1983) (quoting C. MCCORMICK,

MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF

175 (2d ed. 1972)), rev'd, 511 Pa. 112, 511 A.2d 1327 (1986), quotedin
Commonwealth v.Stenhach, 356 Pa. Super. 5, 14, 514 A.2d 114, 118 (1986),
appeal denied, 517 Pa. 589, 534 A.2d 769 (1987).
76. For a discussion of problems associated with an attorney withdrawing
from a case, see text accompanying supra note 58.
77. See People v.Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8, 14 (Colo. 1981); see also DEFENSE
STANDARDS, supra note 45, Standard 4-7.7(c). The court inSchultheis concluded
that:
[a]ny disagreement between counsel and the accused on a decision to
be made before or during trial, however, may be the subject of postconviction proceedings questioning the effectiveness of the lawyer's performance. It is not sufficient to determine the matter solely on the
strength of the memories of the lawyer and client, which are invariably
in conflict if the issue arises. Therefore, although no record of disagreement is required for the trial judge, counsel should proceed with a
request for a record out of the presence of the trial judge and the prosecutor if the court denies the motion to withdraw. ...
638 P.2d at 14.
78. In deciding the issues piecemeal, some courts have set up irreconcilable
situations. In People v.Brown, the court held that the trial court did not err when
it refused to permit counsel to withdraw even after counsel disclosed his belief
that the client intended to commit perjury. People v. Brown, 203 Cal. App. 3d
EVIDENCE
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79

some courts, 79 is the narrative approach stated in ABA Defense
Standard 4-7.7:
If withdrawal from the case is not feasible or is not permitted by the court, or if the situation arises immediately
preceding trial or during the trial and the defendant insists upon testifying perjuriously in his or her own behalf, it is unprofessional conduct for the lawyer to lend
aid to the perjury or use the perjured testimony. Before
the defendant takes the stand in these circumstances, the
lawyer should make a record of the fact that the defendant is taking the stand against the advice of counsel in
some appropriate manner without revealing the fact to
the court. The lawyer may identify the witness as the defendant and may ask appropriate questions of the defendant when it is believed that the defendant's answers
will not be perjurious. As to matters for which it is believed the defendant will offer perjurious testimony, the
lawyer should seek to avoid direct examination of the defendant in the conventional manner; instead, the lawyer
should ask the defendant if he or she wishes to make any
additional statement concerning the case to the trier or
triers of the facts. A lawyer may not later argue the defendant's known false version of facts to the jury as worthy of belief, and may not recite or rely upon the false
80
testimony in his or her closing argument.
1335, 1338-39, 250 Cal. Rptr. 762, 764-65 (1988). The court then dismissed the
untenable position it had put counsel in:
Requiring defense counsel to generally continue representing defendant did not expose counsel to disciplinary or criminal action. He fulfilled his ethical obligation by bringing the motion to withdraw. As the
California Supreme Court noted, in People v. Pike . . . "[i]t is to be
remembered that a person cannot accurately be said to 'allow' that
which he cannot prevent."

. . . We do not address defense counsel's

obligation in respect to how defendant's testimony should be
presented, whether he could question defendant at all, should simply
announce defendant wants to make a statement, or whether some other
procedure should be employed. That issue is not presented by this
case since defendant entered pleas of no contest to the charges.
Id. at 1341 n.3, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 765 n.3 (citations omitted).
79. See, e.g., Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 730 & nn. 1-3, 731 & n.4 (9th
Cir. 1978); Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 437 n. 14 (D.C.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1024 (1976); cf. ABA Formal Op. 87-353, supra note 51, at 901.106-07
(committee contrasts its approach to narrative approach).
80. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 45, Standard 4-7.7(c). The standard
was not enacted by the ABA House of Delegates during the February 1979
meeting pending the outcome of the Kutak Commission's studies.
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The assumption made by this approach is that by not actually
questioning the client and not arguing the perjured testimony to
the factfinder, the lawyer has not offered the false evidence, or
engaged in, or assisted the client in her criminal conduct.
Putting aside for the moment the question of whether this
passive approach in fact extricates the lawyer from participation
in the perjury, courts and commentators disagree as to whether it
even protects the client as it is intended to do. Professor Monroe
Freedman charges that it amounts to disclosure to the judge and
jury that the lawyer does not believe his client's story. He points
out that experienced trial attorneys have noted that jurors assume
the defendant's lawyer knows the truth and will draw only one
reasonable inference from the lawyer who "turns his or her back
on the defendant at the most critical point in the trial, and then,
in closing argument sums up the case with no reference to the fact
that the defendant has given exculpatory testimony" 8 1 -that the
client lied. Freedman also suggests that the lawyer might not get
away with the narrative approach, noting that the prosecutor
might well object to this method of testifying. 82
Others disagree, finding this a perfectly valid possibility. In
Lowery, the court suggested that "passive refusal to lend aid to
what is believed to be perjury in accordance with the Defense
Function Standards" would not necessarily violate due process.8 3
It noted that most jurors would not observe any difference and
that there may be many reasons for a lawyer's failing to actively
pursue a particular line of defense. 84 The court cited a comment
by then Circuit Judge Warren E. Burger, who, responding to a
hypothetical case, suggested the narrative approach and noted
that "[s]ince this informal procedure is not uncommon with witnesses, there is no basis for saying that this tells the jury the witness is lying. A judge may infer that such is the case but lay jurors
85
will not."
In a recent opinion, however, the ABA Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility rejected the narrative approach as
81. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 38, at 37.

82. Id.
83. Lowery, 575 F.2d at 731.

For further discussion of Lowery, see supra

notes 63-65 and accompanying text.

84. 575 F.2d at 731.
85. Burger, Standards of Conductfor Prosecution and Defense Personnel. A Judge's
Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. LAw Q., 11, 13 (1966), cited in Lowery, 575 F.2d at 731
n.4. It is interesting to note that Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion of the
Court in Whiteside and there rejected the narrative approach based, however, on
the revised Model Rules. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 170 & n.6, 171.
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not solving the problem, citing Whiteside for support. The Committee stated in Opinion 87-353 that under Model Rule 3.3(a)(2)
and Whiteside, when a lawyer knows for certain that the client intends to commit perjury, "the lawyer can no longer rely on the
narrative approach to insulate the lawyer from a charge of assist86
ing the client's perjury."
The ABA Opinion began by stating that the lawyer's first step
when faced with the announced intention to commit perjury
would be to warn the client of the consequences of perjury, including that the lawyer would have a duty to disclose if the client
in fact commits perjury. The Committee noted that, as occurred
in Whiteside,8 7 this approach will generally work. Thus, the lawyer
may assume the client will testify truthfully, and may examine him
in the normal manner.88
However, in what the Committee described as the "unusual
case, where the lawyer does know, on the basis of the client's
clearly stated intention, that the client will testify falsely at trial
....the lawyer cannot examine the client in the usual manner." ' 9
Emphasizing the duty of confidentiality, the Committee advised
that "the lawyer's conduct should be guided in a way that is consistent, as much as possible, with the confidentiality protections
provided in Rule 1.6, and yet not violative of Rule 3.3."9o To
accomplish this, the Committee suggested first that the lawyer refuse to call the client to the stand when the lawyer knows that the
only testimony the client will offer is false.9 1 In the criminal case,
however, this approach raises the problem of the defendant's
right to testify, a right the Supreme Court assumed in Whiteside. It
is not clear how the Committee resolved this. Later in the opinion, it did point out that while there may be a constitutional right
to testify, there is no constitutional right to testify falsely, a point
made in Whiteside, and about which there can be no serious dis86. ABA Formal Op. 87-353, supra note 51, at 901:107. It is interesting to
note that Whiteside relied on the new Model Rules promulgated by the ABA for
its rejection of the narrative approach. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 170 & n.6, 171.
Thus, the ABA's reliance on Whiteside is a bit circular, especially since the ABA's
own comments to the rule at least raise the narrative approach as an option.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment (1983).
87. The defendant in Whiteside did finally testify truthfully. Whiteside, 475
U.S. at 161-62. Unfortunately, he was convicted, which brought about the ineffective assistance of counsel claim and an appeal to the Supreme Court. Id. at
160-63.
88. ABA Formal Op. 87-353, supra note 51, at 901:106.
89. Id.
90. Id
91. Id.
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pute. 9 2 However, simply stating the obvious truism that there is
no constitutionally protected right to testify falsely does not resolve the tricky question of whether or not the criminal defendant
has the right to take the stand in her own defense.
Perhaps the Committee's simplistic statement is limited to
the virtually inconceivable situation where absolutely no testimony other than the clearly false testimony is involved. As such,
it addresses an unrealistic situation, and therefore offers little real
guidance. While that might appear to be harmless error, it is not,
since the solution could be applied in a dangerously broad fashion to suggest that a lawyer could refuse to put a criminal defendant on the stand in other situations. Not putting the client on the
stand in a criminal matter does not offer a realistic solution to this
problem, and its inclusion in the opinion is deceiving.
The Committee itself identified another problem with not allowing the defendant to testify. It noted that if the client does not
testify the court may well inquire as to whether the client has been
advised of his right to testify. If the client states his desire to testify, the lawyer, according to the Committee, "may have no other
choice than to disclose to the court the client's intention to testify
93
falsely."
Moving past the situation where the only testimony to be offered would be false, the Committee advised that if the client will
offer some testimony other than the announced perjury, the lawyer may examine the client on only those matters, and not on the
subject of the announced intention to lie. 94 It is here that the
Committee pointedly distinguished its resolution from the narrative approach and specifically disapproved that solution. 9 5 Realistically, it may be difficult to limit the client to only truthful
testimony, and the possibility that he will go beyond the lawyer's
questions to give the false testimony looms. This leads to the
next situation: unanticipated or surprise perjury.
III.

SURPRISE PERJURY

While the client's announced intention to commit perjury
creates a complicated problem, unannounced or surprise client
92. Id. at 901:107; Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 173; United States v. Henkel, 799
F.2d 369, 370 (7th Cir. 1986) (defendant had no right to commit perjury), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1101 (1987).
93. ABA Formal Op. 87-353, supra note 51, at 701:106.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 901:106-107.
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perjury may present a more troublesome problem for the profession. Sometimes a lawyer will have no advance warning that her
96
client intends to commit perjury. This was the case in Lowery.
Other times, as is suggested in ABA Opinion 87-353, the lawyer
may believe he has convinced the client not to lie, but the client
may have misrepresented his intentions, or simply panicked and
changed his mind once on the stand. What can a lawyer do at this
point? Has he "knowingly" offered false evidence? Is he assisting the client in conduct he "knows is criminal or fraudulent"
when he finds out after the fact? What action must he take? The
authorities are split.
The first and least controversial option which parallels the
first option under the announced intention to commit perjury, is
to persuade the client to rectify the perjury. 9 7 If this does not
work, and, frankly, persuasion is less likely to work after the perjury has been committed than before, 98 the lawyer may seek to
withdraw. However, withdrawal at this point is even less likely to
be permitted by the court, is even less likely to solve the problem
and is even more likely to telegraph the situation than when it
occurs prior to the defendant lying on the stand.
But what are the lawyer's alternatives if his client does not
rectify the perjury? The lawyer could either disclose the perjury,
or simply continue with full representation, examining the client
and arguing the perjured testimony to the jury. The latter view is
advanced by Professor Freedman, 9 9 but has been universally rejected by the courts and most other commentators.10 0 By actively
offering and arguing the false testimony, the lawyer would un96. Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978) (under Model Rules
and Whiteside, narrative model unacceptable as impermissibly disclosing client
confidence to fact finders). For a discussion of Lowery, see supra notes 63-65 and
accompanying text.
97. Commonwealth v. Alderman, 292 Pa. Super. 263, 271, 437 A.2d 36, 40
(1981); PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment
(1987); ABA Formal Op. 87-353, supra note 51, at 901:103.
98. Before the perjury is committed, the client faces only a disagreement on
what he can do and the possible strategic and other consequences of his intended approach. His risk in agreeing with his lawyer is limited. However, once
he has lied on the stand, he faces not only criminal prosecution for perjury, but
also the grim prospects of the jury convicting him on the primary case because
of his demonstrated perjury, and the impact discovery of this perjury may have
on the judge who will sentence him if convicted.
99. For further discussion of Professor Freedman's work, see supra note 38
and accompanying text.
100. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 170-71; Alderman, 292 Pa. Super. at 271, 437
A.2d at 40.
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questionably participate in the fraud on the tribunal and would
clearly violate the Rules.
Alternatively, the lawyer could follow the ABA's position in
Opinion 87-353 and disclose. This response represents a reversal
of the ABA's policy under the old code and may raise real attorney-client privilege problems, but it is the answer many courts
have suggested.
Model Rule 3.3 provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly
"offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has
offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the
lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures." 10 1 The rule
never describes what the reasonable remedial measures may be.
The comment, while acknowledging the tension between the duty
to keep confidences and the obligation of candor toward the
court, indicates that if all else fails (persuading the client and attempting to withdraw), "the advocate should make disclosure to
the court.... It is for the court then to determine what should be
done- . . . mistrial or perhaps nothing."' 1 2 Actually a mistrial is
a likely result, because if there is a dispute as to the basis of the
lawyer's conclusion that the client committed perjury, and surely
there will be, the matter will have to be resolved and another lawyer would have to represent the client in the resolution
03
proceeding.'
Opinion 87-353 elaborated on this, stating that withdrawal,
though suggested as an option in the comment, will rarely serve
as a remedy for the client's perjury.' 0 4 Interpreting Rule 3.3, the
Committee concluded that "it is now mandatory ... for a lawyer,
who knows the client has committed perjury, to disclose this
knowledge to the tribunal if the lawyer cannot persuade the client
05
to rectify the perjury."'
The Committee acknowledged that the comment to Rule 3.3
indicates the possible ineffective assistance of counsel problem
when disclosure occurs in the criminal context. The Opinion,
however, cited Whiteside's finding that there is no constitutional
right to testify falsely, and that threatening disclosure did not de101. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1983).

102. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 3.3 comment (1983).
It should be noted that the comments are expressly not part of the Model Rules,
but merely provide guidance for compliance. Id.
103. Id.
104. ABA Formal Op. 87-353, supra note 51, at 901:103 n.7.
105. Id. at 901:103.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss1/3

22

Brogan: Responding to Client Perjury under the New Pennsylvania Rules of

1989]

CLIENT PERJURY

prive a defendant of his right to effective assistance of counsel,' 0 6
apparently to support its conclusion that there is no problem with
disclosing the fact after the perjury has been committed. 10 7 The
Committee's Opinion thereby blurs important distinctions in its
citation of Whiteside.
When analyzing Whiteside, it is important to identify exactly
what the Supreme Court held as distinct from what it said. The
question before the Court, and in fact the only issue it could decide, was the question whether the attorneys' behavior in aggressively dissuading the client from committing perjury, denied
Whiteside his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. It is not for the United States Supreme Court to decide the
appropriate rules of ethics to govern attorneys in the several
states. Rather, that is left up to each state.10 8 The Court's discussion of what a lawyer is ethically required to do, permitted to do
and prohibited from doing when faced with client perjury was relevant only to its determination of whether Whiteside's lawyers behaved reasonably in the context of an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. The Court's discussion of lawyers' duties and obligations is simply not binding.
Further, the Court's holding addressed the situation of
threatened disclosure, not the actual disclosure of the client's perjury. Whether actual disclosure would constitute a denial of effective assistance of counsel was a question not before the Court.
Realistically, however, given the Court's lengthy excursion into
what it considered acceptable conduct, one might reasonably conclude that the Supreme Court, when faced with disclosure after
the fact, would also find no sixth amendment violation.
Further, the Supreme Court was interpreting the federal
Constitution's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. This is
not to say that a state court might not find a violation of the
state's constitutional guarantee of effective assistance in such a
case. Pennsylvania might interpret its own provision more
broadly.' 0 9
Another important point must be made. From the attorneyclient privilege perspective, there is a dramatic difference be106. Id. at 901:104.
107. Id.
108. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 176-77 (Brennan, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511 Pa. 112, 129, 511 A.2d 1327, 1336 (1986) (although
Whiteside not binding, it is persuasive).

109. See PENNSYLVANIA

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 3.3 comment

(1987).
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tween disclosure of the intention to commit perjury and disclosure after the fact. Traditionally, the privilege has not protected a
client's announced intention to commit a crime." 0 Therefore,
the disclosure to the court of the intention of a client to commit
perjury in an attempt to prevent the crime may not present an
However, if the attorney-cliattorney-client privilege problem.'
ent privilege attaches to anything, it attaches to a past crime. Once
the client has committed perjury, does it not fall into the past
crimes category?
It could be argued that perjury constitutes a "continuing"
crime of the type which has been characterized as more like an
announced intention than a past crime. 1" 2 One can assert that
perjury, uncorrected, is a continuing crime that taints the deliberations of the tribunal. Presumably that is why the ABA in drafting
the Model Rules required remedial action by the lawyer discovering perjury only until the end of the proceedings.' 13 If the lie is
discovered after the conclusion of the proceedings, no duty
exists.
However, one can as reasonably, perhaps more reasonably,
characterize perjury as a past crime. Is perjury any more a continuing crime than robbery where the goods and money have not
been returned? In the robbery situation, the true owners continue to be deprived of rightful possession of their goods and the
risk is they will never be returned while the thief maintains wrongful possession. However, nobody would suggest that a lawyer
representing a criminal defendant must disclose confidential information regarding such goods or the client's participation in
the crime, or that such information would not be protected by the
attorney-client privilege.1 4 To cavalierly conclude that perjury
110. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 174. For a discussion of this concept, see supra
note 68 and accompanying text.
111. For a discussion of this concept, see supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
112. See Brennan v. Brennan, 281 Pa. Super. 362, 376, 422 A.2d 510, 517
(1980) (information not to be withheld if it will operate to continue a crime).
113. PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4)
(1987); ABA Formal Op. 87-353, supra note 51, at 901:102.
114. Cf Bates v. Doe 1, 57 U.S.L.W. 2268 (1988) (court rejected argument
that leaving scene of accident constitutes continuing crime, and refused to require lawyer to disclose client's identity to victim's family). Distinguish this situation from one where the lawyer comes into possession of the fruits of a crime.
In that instance she would be required eventually to turn the evidence over.
Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 356 Pa. Super. 5, 23, 24, 514 A.2d 114, 123 (1986),
appeal denied, 517 Pa. 589, 534 A.2d 769 (1987). But even there, the source and
the client's involvement would be protected by the attorney-client privilege. Id.
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constitutes a "continuing crime" sends us down a slippery slope
that may lead to unanticipated results.
As noted in Opinion 87-353, the ABA's disclosure approach
represents a reversal of its previous policy, a change perhaps intended by the Rules." l 5 However, a change in the rules of ethics
cannot change the law of attorney-client privilege. The ABA itself
had earlier thought that once committed, perjury was a past
crime, information relating to which, if it met the other requirements of the law of attorney-client privilege, must be protected. 1 6 As originally drafted, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) of
the old Code of Professional Responsibility provided that the lawyer who has information clearly establishing that "[h]is client has,
in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the
same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, shall reveal
the fraud to the affected person or tribunal.""17 The ABA
amended that rule to add an exception to the duty to disclose
"when the information is protected as a privileged communication." 1 1 8 According to the ABA this amendment was necessary to
avoid putting the lawyer in the untenable position of being required by the Code to reveal communications which he was
bound not to reveal according to the law of evidence."19 Thus,
the ABA, at least in 1975, considered disclosure to the court of
information relating to perjury, once committed, to violate the
law of attorney-client privilege.
Under Pennsylvania law, it is possible to fit disclosure of past
perjury into an exception to the attorney-client privilege. In Brennan v. Brennan, the superior court noted that the privilege applies
"unless the exercise of the privilege either operates to permit or
continue a crime or fraud or is clearly shown to be frustrating the
administration of justice."' 120 Such a solution, however, raises
many of the same concerns discussed earlier with respect to relying on the continuing crime argument.
Pennsylvania law may offer another possibility. In consider115. ABA Formal Op. 87-353, supra note 51, at 901:103.
116. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
341 (1975) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 341].

117.

MODEL

CODE OF

PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY

(1980).
118. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1980); see ABA Formal Op. 341, supra note 116.
119. ABA Formal Op. 341, supra note 116.

DR 7-102(B)(1)
DR 7-102(B)(1)

120. Brennan v. Brennan, 281 Pa. Super. 362, 376, 422 A.2d 510, 517

(1980).
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ing the arguably analogous situation of a bail-jumping defendant,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court drew an interesting distinction.
In Commonwealth v. Maguigan,12 1 the prosecutor sought to compel
the defendant's lawyer to disclose what she knew about her client's whereabouts. When she refused, citing attorney-client privilege, she was found in contempt. The supreme court upheld the
contempt order of the trial court. The court based its decision on
a number of grounds, but in elaborating on its reasoning regarding the attorney-client privilege, it said that since the defendant
had sought professional representation regarding the original
crime he was charged with, information relating to it would, of
course, be privileged. However, the court distinguished as separate the defendant's subsequent decision to flee the jurisdiction
of the court and found that it was not something the lawyer could
be consulted professionally about, and, therefore, was not subject
122
to the privilege.
This, however, may do considerable damage to the goals of
the privilege, as discussed above, 123 and may simply not be the
best approach to protecting the tribunal from perjury. If we believe that the lawyer, given candid disclosure by the client, can
usually dissuade her from perjury, we should avoid any facile rule
requiring disclosure which might chill the candid exchange. Disclosure is not required by rules which call for only "reasonable
remedial measures."' 124 Disclosure is specifically mentioned only
in the comment which, according to the court order adopting the
Pennsylvania Rules, "shall not be a part of the Rules."' 12 5
If disclosure is going to be required, should attorneys not be
required to "Mirandize" the client, warning him in advance of
when disclosure might be permitted or required? 2 6 It seems
only fair to do so, especially if the lawyer makes the other representations about the protection of the attorney-client privilege.
However, such a warning would surely chill the relationship and
involve the client in just the sort of second guessing and attempts
to figure what information should be given the lawyer that the
121. 511 Pa. 112, 511 A.2d 1327 (1986).
122. Id. at 131-32, 511 A.2d at 1337.
123. See supra notes 38-41, 68-69 & 75 and accompanying text.

124.

PENNSYLVANIA

RULES

OF

PROFESSIONAL

(1987).

CONDUCT

Rule 3.3(a)(4)

125. In re Code of Professional Responsibility, No. 412 Disciplinary Docket
No. 2 (Pa. Oct. 16, 1987) (order adopting Rules of Professional Conduct to supersede Code of Professional Responsibility).
126. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 38, at 37-38.
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privilege is designed to avoid.' 27 It would also make it less likely
that the lawyer-would have the information and thus the opportunity to dissuade the client's intended perjury.
The question comes down to what constitutes "reasonable
remedial steps," and what approach best serves the administration of justice in the broadest sense, not simply in this narrow
context of solving a particular problem.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Under the new Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct,
lawyers continue to face the intractable dilemma of client perjury.
Although neither the Rules nor other sources of Pennsylvania law
provide complete solutions to the perjury problem, careful consideration of options in particular instances of client perjury provides the only method open to the lawyer which simultaneously
protects her duties to her client and the court. In balancing both
these interests, the lawyer is challenged by the Pennsylvania Rules
to formulate a response to situations of client perjury without
compromising the fundamental yet often divergent loyalties required by the legal profession.
127. For a discussion of this chilling effect, see supra notes 38-41 & 75, and

accompanying text.
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